Abstract: This paper attempts to bridge the gap between revolution studies and democracy studies, and investigates the roles of party politics in individual revolutionary decision. In this study, the revolution to democracy is formulated as an asymmetric global game, and the coordination problem between a single democratic organization (party) and a continuum of ordinary citizens (masses) under incomplete information concerning the strength of autocracy is highlighted. Within appropriate fundamental parameters regarding the relative magnitude of revolutionary cost/return, as well as the size of this organization, the threshold strategies tuple consist the unique rationalizable equilibrium. The existence of a democratic organization, regardless of its action, is shown to increase the incentives for some citizens to join revolution, thus facilitate revolution. Moreover, as the incentives and the political resources in the hand of party change, the various forms of the revolution, ranging from masses revolution to one-side action, emerge. Finally, the policy implication is discussed, the connection with the real world example (students movement) gets special focus, and the efficient ways for democratisation promotion are proposed.